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COMMENTS
SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT:
ANALYZING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19731 prohibits the ad-
ministrators of federally funded activities and programs' from discrimi-
nating against "otherwise qualified" handicapped persons.' This Com-
ment discusses the differences among the courts in their interpretation
of the private right of action under section 504.
Part I of the Comment first gives a brief history of the congres-
sional policies behind the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act." Part I
also describes both the agency enforcement of section 504' and the pri-
vate right of action to enforce section 504.6 In part IV the Comment
discusses the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 504 in South-
The section provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States,
as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by
any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. The head of
each such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the amendments to this section made by the Rehabilitation,
Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978.
Copies of any proposed regulation shall be submitted to appropriate au-
thorizing committees of the Congress, and such regulation may take effect
no earlier than the thirtieth day after the date on which such regulation is
so submitted to such committees.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
2 According to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), four types
of federally funded activities are covered under § 504: (1) employment practices; (2)
preschool, elementary, and secondary education; (3) postsecondary education; and (4)
health, welfare, and social services. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.11-.14, .31-.39, .41-.47, .51-.54
(1983). This Comment focuses on the application of § 504 to employment discrimina-
tion cases.
3 A handicapped person is defined under the Act as "any person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). "Major life activities" are
defined as "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii)
(1983).
" See infra text accompanying notes 12-24.
' See infra text accompanying notes 25-39.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 40-50.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 51-64.
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eastern Community College v. Davis.8
Finally, in part III, the Comment analyzes the different ap-
proaches taken by lower courts in section 504 cases since the Supreme
Court's decision in Southeastern Community College v. Davis. Some
courts require plaintiffs bringing section 504 suits to show discrimina-
tory intent, while others explicitly reject the need for such a showing.9
Some courts believe that section 504 is not violated as long as there is a
reasonable basis for the decision to reject a handicapped applicant,
while others find such an approach overly deferential to section 504
defendants."0 Finally, the courts disagree on the appropriate allocation
of burdens of proof between the plaintiff and the defendant in a section
504 case." In part III these differences are analyzed in light of the
language and policies of the Rehabilitation Act, the agency regulations
interpreting section 504, and the Supreme Court's opinion in South-
eastern Community College v. Davis. The results of this analysis are
summarized in the Conclusion, which gives an overview of how section
504 cases should be litigated.
I. THE ENACTMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 504
A. Congressional Purpose Behind
the Enactment of Section 504
Large numbers of mentally and physically handicapped individu-
als capable of working are underemployed or unemployed. 2 In 1972,
immediately prior to the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
Congress recognized that only an estimated 800,000 of the 22 million
physically handicapped adults in the United States were employed, al-
though an estimated 14 million would work if provided with the oppor-
tunity to do so.13 One of the major legislative purposes behind the en-
actment of Title V"4 of the Rehabilitation Act was to "promote and
- 442 U.S. 397 (1979). For discussion of the effect of Davis on § 504 actions, see
Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section 504 After Southeast-
ern, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 171 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Rehabilitating Section 504];
Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 881 (1980).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 66-100.
'0 See infra text accompanying notes 101-42.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 143-87.
12 See Gittler, Fair Employment and the Handicapped: A Legal Perspective, 27
DE PAUL L. REV. 953, 953-58 (1978); Note, Rehabilitating Section 504, supra note 8,
at 172-73.
a 118 CONG. REC. 3320-21 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams).
14 Title V includes: (1) section 501, which prohibits discrimination by the federal
government in its own hiring practices, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1982); (2) section 503, which
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expand employment opportunities in the public and private sectors for
handicapped individuals."15
Congress recognized that although most handicapped adults were
unemployed many of them could work if provided with adequate train-
ing and job opportunities.1 6 Congress noted that in many instances dis-
crimination, and not a deficiency of training, prevented handicapped
individuals from finding and retaining meaningful employment.17 Em-
ployers' stereotyped assumptions concerning the limitations of handi-
capped individuals contributed to handicapped Americans' being an op-
pressed and hidden minority.i8
The Rehabilitation Act is the major federal mechanism upon
which the handicapped may rely for statutory relief from employment
discrimination. 9 The final goal of the Rehabilitation Act is the "com-
plete integration of all individuals with handicaps into normal commu-
nity living, working, and service patterns."20
mandates nondiscrimination and requires affirmative action by federal contractors re-
ceiving more than $25,000 from the federal government, 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1982);
and (3) section 504, which requires nondiscrimination in any program that receives
federal funding, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
"5 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 2(8), 87 Stat. 355, 357
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (1976)), amended by Rehabilitation, Comprehensive
Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602,
sec. 122(a)(1), 92 Stat. 2955, 2984 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982)).
16 Studies have shown that many handicapped workers are capable of performing
as well as or sometimes better than nonhandicapped persons. See U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 234, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AND THE PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED WORKER 5-8 (1961), cited in Note, Abroad in
the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEo.
L.J. 1501, 1513 nn.82-83 (1973). It has been estimated, for example, that nine out of
ten of the mentally retarded could work if given proper training and rehabilitation. S.
REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6373, 6408; see also 118 CONG. REC. 3320-21 (1972) (statement of Sen.
Williams).
17 See S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 16, at 38-39, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6388-90.
IS Senator Williams stated that:
The handicapped live among us. They have the same hopes, the same
fears, and the same ambitions as the rest of us. . .. Yet, they are today a
hidden population because their problems are different from most of ours.
Only the bravest risk the dangers and suffer the discomforts and humilia-
tions they encounter when they try to live what we consider to be normal,
productive lives. In their quest to achieve the benefits of our society they
ask no more than equality of opportunity.
118 CONG. REC. 3320 (1972).
'9 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination in the
private sector against applicants or employees based on race, religion, sex, or national
origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). Amendments that would have added handicapped
persons to that list of protected classes have been proposed but never enacted. See, e.g.,
H.R. 461, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
20 White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
1984]
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In contrast to other sections of the Act,21 there was an absence of
bona fide legislative history directed specifically at section 504. The
congressional reports that were published in conjunction with the Act
do nothing more than restate the wording of section 504.22 But, in
1974, Congress recognized this lack of legislative history and amended
the Rehabilitation Act to clarify its intended effect and included an af-
ter-the-fact legislative history for section 504.2 The Senate report
stated:
Section 504 was patterned after, and is almost identical
to, the antidiscrimination language of section 601 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 . . . and section 901 of the Education
Amendments of 1972 . . . . The section therefore constitutes
the establishment of a broad government policy that pro-
grams receiving Federal financial assistance shall be oper-
ated without discrimination on the basis of handicap.24
B. Regulatory Enforcement
The Rehabilitation Act, in its original form, did not expressly re-
quire agency regulations to effectuate the policies of the Act. The 1974
amendments to the Act, however, produced a legislative history indicat-
ing that Congress contemplated implementation of section 504 through
regulations. 5 Finally, in 1978, the Act was amended expressly to re-
quire federal agencies to issue regulations implementing the nondis-
crimination requirements of section 504.26
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare [HEW] (now
the Department of Health and Human Services [HHS]) was first given
the responsibility for establishing guidelines and coordinating enforce-
ment of the Act,2 7 but in 1980 responsibility for coordinating agency
516, tit. III, § 301(6), 88 Stat. 1617, 1631 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 701 note
(1976)).
21 See S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 51-70 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, 2125-43.
22 See id. at 50, 70, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2123,
2143.
22 See S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 16, at 4-5, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6376-77.
24 Id. at 39, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6390.
25 See id. at 39-40, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6390-
91; see also S. REP. No. 1139, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1457,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1974).
28 Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, sec. 119, 92 Stat. 2955, 2982 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1982)).
17 President Gerald R. Ford issued an executive order directing the Secretary of
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enforcement of section 504 was transferred to the Attorney General. 8
Each agency providing federal funding to recipients who must
comply with the provisions of section 504 implements those provisions
through regulations modeled after the HHS guidelines.29 Agencies' reg-
ulations prohibit employment discrimination against qualified handi-
capped persons,30 require employers to make reasonable accommoda-
tion to the physical and mental limitations of otherwise qualified
handicapped employees and applicants," and require that any employ-
ment criterion that tends to screen out handicapped persons must be
job-related. 2 According to the regulations, a handicapped person is
"qualified" with respect to federally funded employment if he or she,
"with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
the job in question." 3 The term "essential functions" is used to "em-
phasiz[e] that handicapped persons should not be disqualified simply
because they may have difficulty in performing tasks that bear only a
marginal relationship to a particular job."'
Thus, a handicapped person is "qualified" if he or she is able to
meet the employment standards related to the essential functions of the
job in question. In the event employment standards cannot be met, a
handicapped person is still considered "qualified" if the standards could
be satisfied with reasonable accommodation by the employer. HHS
analysis of its regulations indicates that employers bear the burden of
showing that employment criteria are job related and that a physical or
HEW to establish rules and regulations and issue orders deemed necessary to carry out
the provisions of § 504. Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977), reprinted in 29
U.S.C. § 794 note (1976), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1980),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 note (Supp. V 1981).
28 Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
2000d-1 note (Supp. V 1981). The Department of Justice regulations carrying out the
directions of Exec. Order 12,250 are at 28 C.F.R. §§ 41.1-.58 (1983).
29 28 C.F.R. § 41.4 (1983). A list of the agency regulations implementing section
504 can be found in B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 260 n.52 (2d ed. 1983).
30 E.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.11 (HHS regulations; "Discrimination prohibited").
31 E.g., id. § 84.12 (HHS regulations; "Reasonable accommodation"). Reasonable
accommodation includes: "(1) Making facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by handicapped persons, and (2) job restructuring, part-time or modified
work schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, the provision of
readers or interpreters, and other similar actions." Id.
SI E.g., id. § 84.13 (HHS regulations; "Employment criteria"). The Department
of Labor regulations provide that job qualifications "which would tend to exclude
handicapped individuals because of their handicap ... shall be related to the specific
job or jobs for which the individual is being considered and shall be consistent with
business necessity and safe performance." 29 C.F.R. § 32.14(b) (1983).
33 28 C.F.R. § 41.32 (1983) (Dep't of Justice "Standards for Determining Who
Are Handicapped Persons"; definition of "Qualified handicapped person").
1" 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A at 299 (1983).
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mental characteristic that caused the denial or termination of employ-
ment is essential for the position in question. 5
The administrative procedures for effecting compliance with the
requirements of section 504 are the same as those "applicable to title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."36 Those procedures call for the
submission of a written complaint to the appropriate agency official,
who then investigates the complaint and, if possible, resolves the prob-
lem through informal means.8 7 If compliance cannot be achieved
through informal methods, the agency may impose the sanction of "sus-
pension or termination of or refusal to grant or continue Federal finan-
cial assistance"38 after the employer has been given appropriate oppor-
tunity for a hearing. 9
C. Private Right of Action
Section 504 does not expressly grant private citizens a cause of
action for violation of its provisions. The Supreme Court in Southeast-
ern Community College v. Davis"0 declined to reach the issue of
whether section 504 creates a private cause of action. 1 Every lower
court that has considered this question, however, has agreed that Con-
gress intended to create an implied cause of action under section 504.42
In 1978 the Rehabilitation Act was amended' to grant individuals
See id. The HHS analysis of its regulations states:
Certain commenters urged that the definition of qualified handi-
capped person be amended so as explicitly to place upon the employer the
burden of showing that a particular mental or physical characteristic is
essential. Because the same result is achieved by the requirement con-
tained in paragraph (a) of § 84.13, which requires an employer to estab-
lish that any selection criterion that tends to screen out handicapped per-
sons is job-related, that recommendation has not been followed.
Id.
3 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (1983). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act is codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
37 45 C.F.R. § 80.7 (1983).
- Id. § 80.8.
:9 See id. §§ 80.9-.11, 81.1-.131.
40 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
41 Id. at 404 n.5.
See, e.g., Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 973-74 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 215 (1982); Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1377
(10th Cir. 1981); see also NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1258-59
(3d Cir. 1979); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1284-87 (7th Cir.
1977).
'" Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, sec. 120(a), § 505(a), 92 Stat. 2955, 2982
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a) (1982)). For a discussion of the legislative history of
this amendment, see Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 301-04 (5th
Cir. 1981).
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the rights, remedies, and procedures available under Title VII" as
against federal agencies violating the provisions of section 50445 and
under Title V14 6 as against federally funded private parties violating
section 504.17 Despite this bifurcation, private actions against the fed-
eral government and those against federally funded private parties tend
to be very similar.48 Perhaps the two remain virtually identical because
the language of section 504 and the regulations implementing it provide
enough guidance as to how actions should be litigated that there is little
need to resort to the rights, remedies, and procedures of either Title
VII or Title VI.49 Such an assessment is supported by the recent Su-
preme Court decision in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone.0 Thus,
4' Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
45 Rehabilitation Act § 505(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (1982).
4' Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976
& Supp. V 1981).
47 Rehabilitation Act § 505(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1982).
48 One dissimilarity is that a plaintiff suing the federal government may be re-
quired to exhaust administrative remedies whereas one suing a federally funded private
party may not. Compare Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 303-04
(5th Cir. 1981) (suit against federal government; exhaustion of administrative remedies
required) with Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1380-82 (10th
Cir. 1981) (suit against private party; exhaustion of alternative remedies not required).
In the Fifth Circuit there is a great deal of disparity between suits against the federal
government under § 505(a)(1) and those against private parties under § 505(a)(2).
Compare Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 305-10 (section 504 violation can be made out against
federal government by showing of discriminatory impact) with Doe v. Region 13
Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402, 1408-12 (5th Cir. 1983)
(without evidence of discriminatory animus a private party violates § 504 only if there
is no reasonable basis for its allegedly discriminatory action). The differences between
Prewitt and Doe v. Region 13 seem to be based more on the deciding judges' views of §
504 generally than on distinctions between enforcement under § 505(a)(1) and §
505(a)(2). The later decision, Doe v. Region 13, does not even cite Prewitt, let alone
attempt to distinguish it.
This Comment focuses primarily on cases against private parties simply because
there are more of such cases reported and the disagreement among different courts on
how to analyze such cases is great. But, for the most part, the Comment's conclusions
are also applicable to cases against the federal government.
'1 See Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1384 (5th Cir.
1981) ("The standards for determining the merits of a case under § 504 are contained
in the statute.").
50 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984). In Consolidated Rail Corp. the Court decided that §
504 covered employment discrimination committed by private parties receiving federal
funds even if promoting employment was not a primary objective of the financial assis-
tance. This result conflicted with an express limiting provision of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. §
2000d-3 (1976) ("Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize
action . . . with respect to any employment practice . . . except where a primary ob-
jective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment."), but the Court
held that the 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, designed to enhance private
enforcement of § 504, could not be construed to limit available remedies in a wAy that
would conflict with the language, agency interpretation, and policy of the Rehabilita-
tion Act. 104 S. Ct. at 1253-55.
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private rights of action are governed by the provisions of the Rehabili-
tation Act, with Title VI or Title VII providing a model to guide courts
only on questions left unanswered by the Rehabilitation Act itself.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION IN Southeastern
Community College v. Davis
A. The Major Issues in Davis
Southeastern Community College v. Davis51 is the sole Supreme
Court case addressing the substantive merits of a section 504 action.52
In that case Davis, a severely hearing-impaired person with bilateral
sensori-neural hearing loss,53 sought to be trained as a registered nurse.
Following the results of a medical exam, the defendant Southeastern
Community College, a state institution receiving federal funds, refused
to admit Davis into its associate degree nursing program." The college
asserted that the plaintiff's involvement in the clinical aspect of the
nursing program would result in unsafe conditions for the patients in-
volved since she needed to rely on lip reading for effective
communication.
55
The major issue before the Supreme Court was the meaning of the
words "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" under section 504.
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Southeastern College's
conclusion that Davis was not "otherwise qualified" for admission to its
nursing program did not violate the provisions of section 504.56
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, rejected the Fourth Circuit's
construction of section 504, which interpreted "otherwise qualified" as
requiring federally funded programs to consider handicapped persons'
51 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
52 The Supreme Court refused to deal with the substantive merits of § 504 actions
in University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981), and New York City Transit'
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). The recent case of Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984), dealt only with the scope of § 504 and with available
remedies but not with the merits of the claim.
53 Davis, 442 U.S. at 401. Sensori-neural hearing loss is a form of deafness caused
by nerve damage. When the deafness is bilateral there is loss of hearing in both ears.
See HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 112 (R. Pettersdorf 10th ed.
1983).
" There was no dispute about two factors in this case: (1) the level of plaintiff's
hearing loss and the resulting functional limitations, and (2) the fact that the college
received sufficient federal funds to come under the provisions of § 504.
5 Davis, 442 U.S. at 401. The Supreme Court also had before it the finding of
the district court that plaintiff's hearing disability would not only prevent her from
meeting the objectives of the nursing program but also would prevent the plaintiff from
performing safely in the nursing profession after graduation. Id. at 403.
"Id. at 414.
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qualifications without regard to the handicap.5" The Supreme Court
stated that "[a]n otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet
all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap.""8
Having established that a person's handicap must be taken into
account in determining whether that person is qualified for the feder-
ally funded program, the Court went on to discuss why Southeastern
Community College's refusal to admit Davis did not violate Davis's
rights under section 504. The Court first noted that the physical char-
acteristics the College demanded of an applicant were, in this case,
"necessary for participation in [the] program."" The Court also re-
jected the interpretation that section 504 placed an absolute duty on
administrators of federally funded programs to take "affirmative ac-
tion" to ensure that any handicapped person could participate in their
programs. 60 Instead, the Court suggested that section 504 required only
reasonable modifications of programs to accommodate handicapped per-
sons.61 Thus, the Supreme Court found that the district court was cor-
rect in its determination that Davis was not "otherwise qualified" be-
cause she could not perform the functions necessary for participation in
the program (and for performance of the duties of a registered nurse)
and the program could not reasonably be modified to accommodate her
handicap.
57 Id. at 406. The Fourth Circuit had held that the college had to "reconsider
plaintiff's application for admission to the nursing program without regard to her hear-
ing ability." Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1160 (4th Cir.
1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). The court decided that the defendant college had to
make its decisions based solely on plaintiff's academic qualifications. Id. at 1161.
5 442 U.S. at 406 (emphasis added).
59 Id. at 407.
60 Id. at 407-12. It was argued that if the plaintiff were provided with individual
supervision during direct contacts with patients or if she were exempted from taking
several required courses, the severity of her handicap would not affect her ability to
function within the nursing program. Id. at 407. The Court found that § 504 did not
mandate affirmative action, holding that "neither the language, purpose, nor history of
§ 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative-action obligation on all recipients of
federal funds." Id. at 411 (footnote omitted).
e The Court stated:
We do not suggest that the line between a lawful refusal to extend
affirmative action and illegal discrimination against handicapped persons
always will be clear. It is possible to envision situations where an insis-
tence on continuing past requirements and practices might arbitrarily de-
prive genuinely qualified handicapped persons of the opportunity to par-
ticipate in a covered program .... [S]ituations may arise where a refusal
to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and
discriminatory.
Id. at 412-13.
1984]
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B. Section 504 Issues Not Resolved in Davis
The Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis
did not resolve many important issues involved in the litigation of sec-
tion 504 claims. Most of the opinion seems to be limited to an affirm-
,ance of the district court's factual finding that the plaintiff in this case
was not "otherwise qualified" under section 504."
In particular, the Supreme Court failed to establish the burdens of
proof applicable in a section 504 action. The Court did not articulate
the elements of a section 504 claim; most significantly, it did not discuss
whether discriminatory intent is relevant.6" The Court also did not pro-
vide lower courts with much guidance as to how much deference, if
any, should be given to the determinations made by administrators of
federally funded programs that particular handicapped individuals are
not "otherwise qualified" for participation or employment.'
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Davis these unresolved is-
sues have been considered by lower courts, and their decisions have
yielded conflicting interpretations of the section 504 private cause of
action. The next part of this Comment addresses the conflicts that have
arisen and suggests how such conflicts should be resolved.
III. INTERPRETING "OTHERWISE QUALIFIED" AFTER Davis
Following Southeastern Community College v. Davis5 the lower
courts have diverged significantly in their approaches to section 504
employment discrimination cases. Three specific issues on which the
circuits disagree are the role of intent in section 504 cases, the level of
deference given to the employment decisions of federally funded em-
ployers, and the allocation of the burdens of proof between plaintiffs
and defendants in section 504 cases. This part of the Comment dis-
cusses the results reached on these issues by different circuits and ana-
lyzes the conflicting conclusions of the circuits in light of the language,
policy, and history of the Rehabilitation Act; the regulations promul-
" See id. at 403, 406, 414.
But see id. at 413 ("This type of purpose [to train persons who could serve the
nursing profession in all customary ways], far from reflecting any animus against hand-
icapped individuals, is shared by many if not most of the institutions that train persons
to render professional service.").
The Court does provide at least some guidance on how to review the decisions
of administrators. It indicated that a trial court, after an independent review of the
facts, see 442 U.S. at 403, should determine whether a federally funded program ad-
ministrator has shown that the physical characteristics it requires are "necessary for
participation in [the] program," id. at 407 (emphasis" added).
442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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gated to implement section 504; and the Supreme Court decision in
Davis.
A. Discriminatory Intent
1. Cases Using Discriminatory Intent as a
Factor in Section 504 Actions
In Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Commis-
sion6" the Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's judgment for the de-
fendant notwithstanding the jury's verdict07 awarding the plaintiff em-
ployee money damages. 8 The plaintiff, a former psychiatric worker,
had brought suit under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act challeng-
ing her dismissal for alleged psychological problems.
The court found that the plaintiff was "handicapped" and was
therefore entitled to invoke section 504."9 The court decided, however,
that although the federally funded employer's only basis for terminat-
ing Doe was her psychological handicap, the Mental Health Center's
employment decision did not constitute a violation of section 504. Cru-
cial to the Fifth Circuit's decision was the determination that the plain-
tiff produced no evidence of discriminatory animus on the part of the
employer against persons with impairments similar to the plaintiff's.70
The Fifth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in
Southeastern Community College v. Davis to support judicial deference
to employment decisions made by administrators of federally funded
programs as long as such decisions are not skewed by discriminatory
animus.7 1 In the words of the court, "In determining whether Ms. Doe
" 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983).
67 Id. at 1407, 1409.
6 The jury had awarded Doe $25,000 in damages and found that she should be
reinstated. Id. at 1407. Proof of intentional discrimination in order to recover money
damages may be considered as a separate issue from whether proof of intentional dis-
crimination is required to make out an underlying violation. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983) (Title VI racial and national origin
discrimination; intent not required to establish violation of the law, but is required to
recover money damages recover money damages); see also Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984) (section 504 plaintiff could recover back pay at least
in a case alleging intentional discrimination). In Doe v. Region 13 the Fifth Circuit
dealt only with intent as a requirement to establish a violation of § 504.
60 704 F.2d at 1407-08.
70 Id. at 1409-10. The court found it significant that testimony was presented
showing that the employer had several other employees who also suffered from depres-
sion and had undergone psychiatric counseling but who were not discharged. Id. at
1409.
71 The Fifth Circuit seemed to base this reading on Southeastern Community Col-
lege v. Davis's holding that § 504 did not mandate affirmative action to the degree of
extensive modifications of programs and that a person's handicap could be considered
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was 'otherwise qualified' under the Act, we believe that, in the absence
of any evidence of. . . discriminatory animus . . . , we must analyze
the actions by [the defendant] to determine whether there was a sub-
stantial, reasonable basis for its decision. "72 Finding that the record
presented "uncontroverted evidence of a chronic, deteriorating situation
which is reasonably interpreted to pose a threat to the patients with
whom the employee must work," the court upheld the trial court's
judgment for the defendant. 3
Doe v. Region 13 is not alone in its holding that intent plays a
role in establishing a section 504 violation. 4 No court seems to have
gone so far as to hold that discriminatory intent must be proved in
order to make out a section 504 violation. The deferential approach
taken by some courts to decisions not shown t6 be accompanied by dis-
criminatory animus, however, is often just as fatal to otherwise valid
section 504 claims.
2. Cases Rejecting Discriminatoiy Intent as a
Factor in Section 504 Actions
In Pushkin v. Regents of the University of Colorado7 5 the Tenth
Circuit decided that the defendant University of Colorado had discrimi-
nated against the plaintiff because of his multiple sclerosis by denying
him admission into its Psychiatric Residency Program. The court re-
in determining whether that person was "otherwise qualified" for participation. See
Doe v. Region 13, 704 F.2d at 1410. The Supreme Court in Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, for the most part, did not use language of discriminatory intent or of
judicial deference. But see 442 U.S. at 413 (noting in passing that Southeastern's pro-
gram did not "reflect[ ] any animus against handicapped individuals"). Rather, despite
its lack of citation to the source, Doe v. Region 13's intent requirement and its defer-
ence to the decisions of employers seem to have their genesis in the Supreme Court case
holding that discriminatory intent is required in order to establish that an employment
decision violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 246-47 (1976). See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
71' Doe v. Region 13, 704 F.2d at 1410.
73 Id. at 1412.
74 In Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit
supported New York University's refusal to readmit a medical student because of psy-
chiatric problems by holding that "considerable judicial deference" should be paid to
the evaluations made by a federally funded institution, "absent proof that its standards
and its application of them serve no purpose other than to deny an education to handi-
capped persons." Id. at 776.
In Guerriero v. Schultz, 557 F. Supp. 511 (D.D.C. 1983), the District of Colum-
bia district court ruled that the Foreign Service was justified in its decision to fire a
foreign service officer who suffered from acute alcohol addiction and a schizoid person-
ality disorder. The court held that the plaintiff failed to carry his prima facie burden of
proof because he was unable to show "the Secretary's discriminatory motive or his own
qualification for retention." Id. at 513.
75 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
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jected the University's argument that discrimination could not be found
under section 504 in the absence of recognized discriminatory intent.
The court stated:
It would be a rare case indeed in which a hostile discrimina-
tory purpose or subjective intent to discriminate solely on the
basis of handicap could be shown. Discrimination on the ba-
sis of handicap usually results from more invidious causative
elements and often occurs under the guise of extending a
helping hand or a mistaken, restrictive belief as to the limita-
tions of handicapped persons. A claim under § 504 would be
analyzed more readily under a "disparate impact" theory
where it is claimed that a facially neutral practice has a dis-
criminatory impact on persons within a protected class."'
The court went on to say, however, that section 504 should not be ana-
lyzed only in terms of either disparate treatment 7 or disparate im-
pact."' Rather, section 504 "sets forth its own criteria for scrutinizing
claims under [the] statute."'7  Accordingly, the court held that a handi-
capped individual establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by
showing that he or she is otherwise qualified and was rejected for the
76 Id. at 1385.
7 Disparate treatment is a term used to refer to one type of discrimination that
violates Title VII. To prove disparate treatment a plaintiff must establish that he or
she was not hired or was fired because of his or her race, sex, religion, or national
origin. Thus, it is essential that the plaintiff establish that there was discriminatory
intent on the part of the employer, although intent may be inferred from the mere
effects of discrimination. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977). The burden is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. The plaintiff
can satisfy this burden by proving that he or she (1) is within a protected class, (2)
applied for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants and for which he or
she was qualified, (3) was denied the job, and (4) that the employer continued to seek
applicants for the position. If the plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima fade
case, the employer must prove legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for the plain-
tiff's rejection. The plaintiff finally can override the rebuttal by establishing that the
defendant's proffered reasons were merely a pretext for an underlying discriminatory
motive. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
78 Disparate impact is a term used to describe an alternative form of discrimina-
tion that also violates Title VII. To make a successful disparate impact claim a plaintiff
need not prove discriminatory intent. Rather, he or she must establish that the em-
ployer in question was using hiring criteria that resulted in the elimination of appli-
cants in a class protected by Title VII. If the plaintiff establishes adverse impact, the
employer must prove that the criteria were used out of business necessity and were
reasonably accurate indicators of future performance in the jobs in question. Once the
employer has established that the qualifications used were related to job performance,
the plaintiff can still win the case by showing that the "necessary" criteria were used as
a pretext for discrimination against a protected class. It is only at this point that dis-
criminatory motive becomes relevant in disparate impact cases. See Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
71 Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1385.
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position in question solely on the basis of his or her handicap.80
Many courts agree with the approach most forcefully advocated in
Pushkin. Some courts explicitly state that section 504 does not require
any showing of discriminatory intent."1 Other courts demonstrate im-
plicit agreement with that approach by deciding section 504 cases with-
out mention of discriminatory intent or animus in their analysis.82 The
analysis in these cases clearly conflicts with the approach adopted by
the Fifth Circuit in Doe v. Region 13. In Doe v. Region 13 intent was
relevant to the determination whether section 504 has been violated. In
Pushkin and in other section 504 cases discriminatory intent is irrele-
vant to that determination.
3. Analysis of the Intent Requirement
The Rehabilitation Act does not explicitly state whether a showing
of discriminatory intent is relevant in establishing a section 504 viola-
tion. The Act does not require courts to consider or not to consider
evidence of discriminatory animus in deciding how to examine the em-
ployment decisions of federally funded employers. The policy of the
Act, the legislative history, and the regulations implementing section
504, however, all point to the conclusion that intent should be irrele-
vant to the determination of a section 504 violation.
Section 504 is part of a civil rights statute and as such should be
interpreted broadly so as to effectuate its remedial purposes. 8 The sec-
tion was enacted in an effort to halt a long history of discrimination
against handicapped individuals. Congress proclaimed that the final
goal of the Rehabilitation Act is "the complete integration of all indi-
viduals with handicaps into normal community living, working, and
service patterns."" Requiring a showing of discriminatory animus in
section 504 actions would frustrate the legislative aim of eliminating
S*Id.
*a NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1331 (3d Cir. 1981) (en
banc); Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 966-67 (N.D. Cal. 1979); see also Tread-
well v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (11th Cir. 1983) (enforcement of Rehabilitation Act
against federal government defendant); Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d
292 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (same).
" Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983); Bentivegna v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982); Simon v. St. Louis
County, 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981).
" See Cook v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 502 F. Supp. 494, 501-02 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971) (civil rights statutes
must be as broad as their language and remedial purposes).
" White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
516, tit. III, § 301(6), 88 Stat. 1617, 1631 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 701 note"(1976)).
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discrimination against handicapped persons.
Only rarely, if ever, could a handicapped individual prove that
exclusion from employment occurred as a result of hostile discrimina-
tory purpose or subjective intent to discriminate solely on the basis of
handicap. Rather, discriminatory actions against the handicapped are
often based on employers' paternalistic, stereotyped assumptions con-
cerning the inability of handicapped persons to contribute fully to the
work force. Many well-meaning employers misapprehend the abilities
and limitations of handicapped persons."5 Section 504 was meant to
correct these mistakes, not just to prohibit hostile animus.
In order fully to effectuate the policy of the Rehabilitation Act to
"promote and expand employment opportunities... for handicapped
individuals,"86 a claim under section 504 should not depend on a show-
ing of discriminatory intent or animus. The policy of section 504 indi-
cates that if a handicapped individual can perform a job, it is improper
for the administrator of a program receiving federal funds not to hire
that person. Intentions, good or bad, are irrelevant.
In addition to general policy reasons, Congress indicated more spe-
cifically its intention that a showing of discriminatory intent should not
be required for a violation of section 504 by patterning section 504
after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.87 Congress added section
505(a)(2)" to the Rehabilitation Act in order to make Title VI rights
and remedies applicable to section 504. In doing so, Congress indicated
its approval of the interpretation that a showing of intent should not be
required in order to make out a section 504 violation.8 9
*s Gittler, supra note 12, at 967-70; see also Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1385.
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 2(8), 87 Stat. 355, 357
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (1976)), amended by Rehabilitation, Comprehensive
Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-602, sec.
122(a)(1), 92 Stat. 2955, 2984 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982)).
87 Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
Section 504's similarity to § 601 of the Civil Rights Act was not accidental. Legis-
lative history of § 504 indicates that the section was modeled after both Title VI and
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982). See
S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 16, at 39-40, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6390-91.
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, sec. 120(a), § 505(a)(2), 92 Stat. 2955,
2982 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1982)). Section 505(a)(2) provides, "The
remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient
of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under section 504 of this
Act."
89 Cf Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (noting that the
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In construing a federal statute, courts typically grant a great deal
of deference to the interpretations of the federal agency charged with
enforcement of that statute.90 The regulations implementing section 504
clearly contemplate that the section is violated by actions resulting in
discriminatory effects without any showing of discriminatory intent.
For example, HHS regulations provide that recipients of federal funds
"may not limit, segregate, or classify applicants or employees in any
way that adversely affects their opportunities or status because of hand-
icap."91 Employers "may not make use of any employment test or other
selection criterion that screens out or tends to screen out handicapped
persons or any class of handicapped persons" unless the criterion is
shown to be job-related and alternative criteria that do not tend to
screen out handicapped individuals are not available.9" It is the effect of
employment criteria that matters, not the employers' intentions. Thus,
the policy behind the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, the legisla-
tive history of the Act, and the regulations implementing section 504 all
indicate that intent should be irrelevant in establishing a section 504
violation.
The courts that require a showing of discriminatory animus in
section 504 cases appear to be grafting equal protection clause jurispru-
dence onto section 504. In Washington v. Davis9 the Supreme Court
held that a violation of the equal protection clause can be made out
only if discriminatory intent, and not just discriminatory impact, can be
shown. The Court noted, however, the difference between establishing
a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"' and a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause:
1974 Rehabilitation Act amendments "made it clear that Congress expected and in-
tended that words similar to Title VI would be interpreted as they impliedly had been
in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)" to allow a private right of action); id. at 962
n.73 (quoting the 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act adding § 505(a)(2) and
noting that "[t]hese amendments further show the Congressional intent to have section
504 construed in the same manner as Title VI"). Intent is not required to establish a
violation of the law under Title VI according to both Lau and the more recent case of
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983). See infra notes 96-
100 and accompanying text.
1* Zenith Radio Corp. v United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978), Udall v. Tall-
man, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
9 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(3) (1983).
02 Id. § 84.13(a). HHS commentary on its regulations indicates that 45 C.F.R. §
84.13(a) adopts the approach of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See
45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A at 303 (1983). Griggs holds that employment discrimination
can be established under Title VII without a showing of discriminatory intent. 401
U.S. at 429-33.
93 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
94 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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Under Title VII, Congress provided that when hiring
and promotion practices disqualifying substantially dispro-
portionate numbers of blacks are challenged, discriminatory
purpose need not be proved, and that it is an insufficient
response to demonstrate some rational basis for the chal-
lenged practices. ... [T]his process . . . involves a more
probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seem-
ingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is
appropriate under the Constitution where special racial im-
pact, without discriminatory purpose, is claimed. We are not
disposed to adopt this more rigorous standard for the pur-
poses of applying [the equal protection clause to employment
discrimination cases.]
95
Rehabilitation Act cases adopting an intent requirement for a section
504 violation seem to carry the approach of Washington v. Davis over
into employment discrimination cases under section 504. They hold
that absent discriminatory intent, deference is due to the employment
decisions of administrators of federally funded programs.
Instead of following the standards for a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause, courts interpreting section 504 should use the standards
of Title VI as their starting point, as they are explicitly instructed to do
in section 505(a)(2). As established in Lau v. Nichols, 8 no showing of
intent is required in order to establish a violation of Title VI. The lack
of an intent requirement under Title VI was reaffirmed in the employ-
ment discrimination context last Term in Guardians Association v.
Civil Service Commission.9 7 This Term, in Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone,98 the Court indicated that, at least to the extent they further
the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act,9" Title VI standards-including
, 426 U.S. at 246-48.
414 U.S. 563 (1974).
9 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3223 & n.2 (1983). Although Guardians Ass'n reaffirms the
lack of an intent requirement under Title VI, it holds that discriminatory intent must
be shown in order to recover compensatory damages under Title VI. Id. at 3223.
* 104 S. Ct. at 1248 (1984).
• The main issue in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone was whether an em-
ployer could be sued under § 504 even if promoting employment was not a primary
objective of the federal funding received. 104 S. Ct. at 1251-52. Despite § 505(a)(2)'s
incorporation of the rights, remedies, and procedures of Title VI and Title VI's express
limitation of its coverage to "employment practicefs] . . where a primary objective of
the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment," 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3
(1976), the Supreme Court held that an employer could be sued under § 504 regardless
of whether a primary objective of its federal funding is to promote employment. 104 S.
Ct. at 1253-56. The Court believed that "it would be anomalous to conclude that [§
505(a)(2)], 'designed to enhance the ability of handicapped individuals to assure com-
pliance with [§ 504],' . . . silently adopted a drastic limitation on the handicapped
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those stated in Guardians Association 00-would be applied to section
504 actions. Thus, recent Supreme Court decisions, as well as the his-
tory and policy of the Rehabilitation Act, indicate that there should be
no requirement of a showing of discriminatory intent in order to estab-
lish a violation of section 504.
B. Judicial Deference to the Decisions of Administrators of
Federally Funded Programs
1. Applying a "Rational Basis" Test in Section 504 Actions
In Doe v. New York University"'1 the Second Circuit decided that
NYU was justified in its decision to deny readmission of a psychologi-
cally impaired applicant into its medical school program. The court
stated that the plaintiff's fine record for five years preceding reapplica-
tion was not sufficient to overcome the school's legitimate concerns that
her past behavioral problems might recur.
Essential to the court's analysis was its determination that judicial
deference must be paid to decisions made by administrators of federally
funded programs. Even though the Second Circuit admitted that section
504 requires the court, and not the federally funded institution, to make
the final decision as to whether a handicapped individual is "otherwise
qualified," the court insisted that "considerable judicial deference must
be paid to the evaluation made by the institution itself, absent proof
that its standards . . . serve no purpose other than to deny participa-
individual's right to sue federal grant recipients for employment discrimination." Id. at
1255 (quoting S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978)). Thus, it appears that
the rights, remedies, and procedures of Title VI will only be applied to § 504 to the
extent that they are consistent with the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act.
100 In order to reach the "primary objective" limitation issue in Consolidated Rail
Corp., the Supreme Court had to consider whether the case was mooted by the death of
the handicapped individual who sought employment. The Court held that the case was
not moot because the original plaintiff's estate could recover back pay under § 504.
Although the Court did not say that a plaintiff must allege intentional discrimination to
recover back pay, it said that at least in this case, in which intentional discrimination
was alleged, back pay was an available remedy. The Court stated:
In Guardians Ass'n . . . a majority of the Court expressed the view
that a private plaintiff under Title VI could recover backpay; and no
member of the Court contended that backpay was unavailable, at least as
a remedy for intentional discrimination. It is unnecessary to review here
the grounds for this interpretation of Title VI. It suffices to state that we
now apply this interpretation to § 505(a)(2), that, as we have noted, pro-
vides to plaintiffs under § 504 the remedies set forth in Title VI. There-
fore, respondent, having alleged intentional discrimination, may recover
backpay in the present § 504 suit.
104 S. Ct. at 1252-53. (footnotes omitted).
101 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
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tion to handicapped individuals.' 0° According to the Second Circuit,
the "pivotal" issue that should be addressed by the courts in their re-
view of suits brought under section 504 is whether, under all the cir-
cumstances presented, the federally funded institution had a "reasona-
ble basis for finding the plaintiff not to be qualified or not as well
qualified as other applicants." 0 s
The reasonable or rational basis standard has been applied by
other courts in their review of suits brought under section 504 against
the administrators of federally funded programs."' In response to an
action brought under section 504 against a federally funded employer,
the Fifth Circuit in Doe v. Region 13'05 stated that the case should be
decided by looking at the totality of the evidence to see if the employer
was "reasonably justified in believing that [the handicapped employee]
was not 'otherwise qualified.' "106 The court held that there was no
violation of section 504 because "[s]ubstantial, rational bases existed for
[the employer's] action.
'1 0 7
Closely connected to judicial deference to employment decisions is
the tendency of some courts to be swayed by evidence of vague predic-
tions of future performance as a basis for employment decisions ad-
versely affecting the handicapped. In Doe v. Region 13 the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed a judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the jury
verdict favorable to the plaintiff. The case involved the discharge of a
staff psychologist at a mental health center. The employer admitted
that the plaintiff had done an excellent job. She had carried one of the
heaviest caseloads at the center, had seen more patients than the other
psychiatric workers, and had done a good job as local school board con-
sultant.1 08 She was seen as diligent and hard working, and her patients
were reported to have liked her. 09 In fact, the plaintiff had continued
to do an "outstanding" job by all objective standards until her
discharge.110
Despite her excellent performance the plaintiff was discharged be-
102 Id. at 776.
103 Id. (emphasis added).
104 See Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d
1402, 1412 (5th Cir. 1983); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1977);
Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107, 114 (W.D. Va. 1981).
105 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983).
10 Id. at 1412 (emphasis added).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1404.
19 The plaintiff received very favorable work evaluations during the time she was
employed by the clinic and while she was allegedly suffering from her psychological
problems. Id.
110 Id.
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cause her depressive neurosis caused her superiors to be "concerned
about the well-being of [her] patients."1 " The defendant's "'concern
was for [the plaintiff's] future performance, not her past perform-
ance.' "112 The court held that no violation of section 504 could be
found because the plaintiff's condition could be "reasonably interpreted
to pose a threat to the patients with whom the employee must work." '
Thus, despite plaintiff's outstanding work record, vague predictions of
possible consequences of her handicap for her future job performance
were held to preclude the possibility of a. finding of a section 504
violation."
2. Rejection of Judicial Deference in Section 504 Actions
In contrast to the high level of deference given to administrators of
federally funded programs by some courts, the Third Circuit in
Strathie v. Department of Transportation1 " rejected the deferential ap-
proach. The court decided that, although federally funded administra-
tors are entitled to some judicial deference due to their experience,
"broad judicial deference resembling that associated with the 'rational
basis' test would substantially undermine Congress' intent in enacting
section 504 that stereotypes or generalizations not deny handicapped
individuals equal access to federally-funded programs." ' 6 The court
decided that, under section 504, the following standard should replace
the rational basis test in the review of decisions by administrators of
federally funded programs:
A handicapped individual who cannot meet all of a pro-
gram's requirements is not otherwise qualified if there is a
factual basis in the record reasonably demonstrating that ac-
commodating that individual would require either a modifi-
cation of the essential nature of the program, or impose an
"I1 Id. at 1406.
11 Id. at 1409.
113 Id. at 1412.
1" See also Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (11th Cir. 1983). In Treadwell
a handicapped plaintiff brought suit under §§ 501 and 504 alleging that the Army
Corps of Engineers office did not have adequate basis for determining that the plaintiff
could not do the work of a park technician due to his heart condition. The basis for the
decision not to hire the plaintiff was a prediction that, due to his heart condition, the
plaintiff could not safely operate a motor boat alone or handle certain types of disor-
derly park visitors. Even though these types of skills were only marginally necessary for
the job, the Eleventh Circuit decided that they served as an adequate basis for not
hiring the plaintiff.
115 716 F.2d 227 (3d. Cir. 1983).
116 Id. at 231 (footnote omitted).
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undue burden on the recipient of federal funds.11
Under this standard it is unacceptable for recipients of federal
funds to demonstrate merely a subjective, reasonable basis for making
decisions that exclude handicapped individuals. The mere fact that the
recipient of federal funds acted in a rational manner is not seen as a
defense to a discriminatory act.1 "
In Strathie a school bus driver was denied state licensing due to a
hearing impairment. Applying its standard to this situation the Third
Circuit first determined for itself the essential nature of the school bus
driver licensing program. The court did not accept the defendant's view
that the essential purpose of its licensing standards was "to ensure the
highest level of safety."' 9 Rather, the Third Circuit found that "the
essential nature of the program is to prevent any and all appreciable
risks that a school bus driver will be unable to provide for the control
over and safety of his passengers. '112 Having determined the essence of
the program, the court examined the record for a factual basis upon
which to find that accommodating Strathie's handicap would conflict
with that essential nature of the program or impose an undue burden
on the defendant. The court considered each of the reasons proffered by
the defendant but found that the plaintiff had presented evidence ar-
guably rebutting each one.12 It therefore reversed the district court's
summary judgment for the defendant.
22
By requiring a factual basis on the record the Third Circuit in
Strathie adopted an approach contrasting sharply with that of courts
that rely on vague predictions of possible future consequences of handi-
caps on job performance. The Third Circuit noted that its standard
would find unlawful any exclusion of handicapped individuals that was
based on nothing more than "a remote possibility" of a future
hazard.1
23
The Eighth Circuit in Simon v. St. Louis County'24 arrived at a
similar standard to the one delineated by the Third Circuit in Strathie.
In Simon, an action was brought by a former commissioned county po-
lice officer who was discharged after sustaining a gun-shot wound that
117 Id.
118 Cf. Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1383 ("The rational basis test is not applicable
where there is an alleged violation of a statute, § 504, which prohibits discrimination
on the basis of handicap.").
119 716 F.2d at 232.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 232-34.
122 Id. at 234.
123 Id. at 231.
124 656 F.2d 316 (11th Cir. 1981).
1984]
888 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
left him paraplegic. He alleged that the discharge was a violation of the
Rehabilitation Act. In this case the court scrutinized the employment
requirements as set forth by the defendant employer to see if they were
"necessary and legitimate requirements of the job." '25 It was therefore
insufficient for the defendant to show it had some reasonable basis for a
decision to exclude the handicapped plaintiff. Simon, like Strathie, re-
quires that defendants demonstrate a direct link between selection crite-
ria and the essential nature of the program involved.
The viewpoint of the Third Circuit is also supported by the posi-
tions adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Bentivegna v. United States De-
partment of Labor,"6 and the Tenth Circuit in Pushkin v. Regents of
the University of Colorado.2" In both cases, the courts decided that
broad assumptions of future performance were an unacceptable basis
for decisions that excluded the handicapped individuals. The courts
held that "weak and inadequate threads" of evidence could not be used
to support decisions having important consequences for handicapped
persons.
128
3. Analysis of Judicial Deference
to Program Administrators' Decisions
Due to the unique relationship between handicaps and work func-
tion, most handicaps "reasonably" could be viewed as having some pos-
sible effect on future job performance. Unlike race in the racial dis-
crimination context,12 9 for example, the characteristic that gives rise to
125 Id. at 320.
126 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982).
127 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
128 In Bentivegna the court decided that there was insufficient evidence to support
the City of Los Angeles's decision to require certain blood sugar levels for diabetics to
be allowed participation in its job training program. There was not enough concrete,
factual evidence to make the prediction that diabetics with elevated blood sugar levels
are at greater risk of injury than well-controlled diabetics. The court decided that the
City's evidence showed "'weak and inadequate threads' to support a decision having
important consequences for a handicapped person." 694 F.2d at 622. In Pushkin the
court decided that the conclusion of the examining board in deciding that the plaintiff
was not "otherwise qualified" for acceptance into a psychiatric residency program be-
cause of multiple sclerosis was based on psychological theories that were derived from
incorrect assumptions and inadequate factual grounds. The court decided that such ra-
tionales could not be used to make decisions that would affect the entire future of the
plaintiff. 658 F.2d at 1391.
129 Title VII provides that it is illegal for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(1976). If, as with race under Title VII, Congress insisted that employers ignore the
protected characteristic, the statute would not permit an employer of bus drivers to
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the legally protected status in handicap discrimination cases may also
directly limit the individual's actual job performance.'- A plaintiff
bringing an action under section 504 is required to prove the substanti-
ality of his or her handicap in order to meet the Act's definitional re-
quirements of a person who is handicapped, but simultaneously the
plaintiff is also required to show that he or she is not so handicapped
as to be unqualified to perform the job.1 1
If handicapped individuals may be excluded from opportunities on
the basis of vague factual predictions and unproven assumptions merely
because they are "reasonable," employment and other opportunities for
the handicapped will be severely restricted. It is exactly because handi-
caps can be inextricably tied in with work function that courts must be
careful to require accurate factual grounds on the record showing that a
handicapped person is unable to meet the essential functions of the job.
Employment decisions should be based on focused attention to the qual-
ifications and limitations of the individual job seeker 82 and not solely
on generalized predictions of possible consequences of the impairment
in question.
Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act with the express purpose
to "promote and expand employment opportunities in the public and
private sectors for handicapped individuals." ' ' It would be contrary to
the policies of the Act to allow employers to base employment decisions
against the handicapped on vague predictions of future performance.
This type of deference would encourage the use of stereotypes and gen-
eralizations as a basis for making important employment decisions hav-
ing serious implications for handicapped workers.
Section 504 expressly provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified
handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." ' It does not create any exception to its provi-
sions for "reasonable" actions that deny handicapped individuals the
right to participate in a program.
The regulations implementing section 504 require employers to
"make reasonable accommodation to the . . . limitations of an other-
exclude those who are totally blind. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. at 407 n.7.
230 See Gittler, supra note 12, at 967; see also Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp.
171, 206 (D.N.H. 1981).
131 See Doe v. Region 13, 704 F.2d at 1408 n.6.
132 E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (D. Hawaii 1980).
13 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
1" Rehabilitation Act § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
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wise qualified handicapped applicant or employee. 13 5 To be free of
the duty to accommodate, the employer must "demonstrate that the ac-
commodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its
program."'3' a The regulations also prohibit employment criteria that
tend to exclude handicapped individuals and are not "shown to be job-
related for the position in question."1 The Department of Labor re-
quires such criteria to "be related to the specific job or jobs for which
the individual is being considered and [to] be consistent with business
necessity and safe performance.1 138 These regulations, far from being
deferential to program administrators, require administrators to prove
that they are not discriminating.
Perhaps more importantly, the regulations define a "[q]ualified
handicapped person" with respect to employment as "a handicapped
person who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the job in question."' 39 The basic issue that courts must
decide in section 504 cases is whether a handicapped individual is "oth-
erwise qualified" for the position sought. In order to make this deter-
mination a court must ascertain the essential functions of the job in
question and then decide whether the handicapped plaintiff, with rea-
sonable accommodation, can perform those essential functions. Careful
attention must be paid to what is essential in order that handicapped
individuals not be excluded where they need not be. The determination
of what accommodation is reasonable is a difficult one, but if section
504 is to have any effect, that determination must ultimately be made
by the court weighing all the evidence on both sides and not by the
program administrator who has a vested interest on one side of the
issue.
The Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis
interpreted section 504 in a manner consistent with the regulations de-
scribed above. The Court found that the criteria for qualification re-
quired by Southeastern did not violate section 504 because they were
clearly "necessary for participation in its nursing program" '4  and the
program could not reasonably be modified to accommodate the plain-
tiff."' This case does not support a deferential approach to the deci-
sions of administrators. Rather it requires the courts to determine de
novo the issues of necessity and reasonable accommodation. The Su-
135 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1983).
23 Id.
137 Id. § 84.13(a)(1).
1- 29 C.F.R. § 32.14 (1983).
131 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1983).
140 442 U.S. at 407.
141 Id. at 412-13.
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preme Court specifically noted that "the District Court found [the
physical qualifications] . . indispensable for many of the functions a
registered nurse performs."14 Ultimately, the court, not the program
administrator, must determine whether a section 504 plaintiff was
"otherwise qualified."
Courts approving of the actions of administrators of federally
funded programs as long as they have a rational basis are condoning
precisely the kind of discrimination section 504 was meant to alleviate.
The Rehabilitation Act, by its provisions, nowhere suggests that a fed-
erally funded employer may act in any reasonable manner even if dis-
crimination would result. Both the regulations implementing section
504 and the Supreme Court decision in Southeastern Community Col-
lege v. Davis require reasonable accommodation of handicaps in the
workplace and prohibit selection criteria that exclude handicapped per-
sons and are not necessary for the position in question. Finally, by its
very nature, discrimination against handicapped individuals can only be
recognized and remedied by careful attention to the specific limitations
of the individual involved and the requirements of the position sought.
Such careful attention to the details of allegedly discriminatory actions
cannot be provided by courts that grant undue deference to the judg-
ment of federally funded program administrators. Those courts are ab-
dicating their responsibilities under the Rehabilitation Act.
C. Burdens of Proof
One final issue on which the circuits are divided is the allocation
of the burdens of proof in section 504 cases. The courts appear to be in
agreement that the disparate treatment model of allocation of burdens
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green143 is not applicable
to section 504.144 Those that have addressed the issue, however, also
seem to be in agreement that the general three-part framework of the
McDonnell Douglas allocation-with a prima facie showing by the
plaintiff, a showing by the defendant, and then a chance for the plain-
tiff to rebut the defendant's proof-is applicable.145 The two courts that
ate in open disagreement are the Tenth Circuit in Pushkin v. Regents
of the University of Colorado14' and the Second Circuit in Doe v. New
11, Id. at 407.
143 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
144 See, e.g., Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d at 776-77; Pushkin, 658 F.2d at
1384-87.
145 See Doe v. Region 13, 704 F.2d at 1408 n.6; Doe v. New York Univ., 666
F.2d at 776-77; Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1385-87.
146 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
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York University.1 47 The basic disagreement is over whether and when
the burden of persuasion falls upon the defendant to establish that the
plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified."
1. Burden of Persuasion on Defendant
In Pushkin the Tenth Circuit held that once a plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case "defendants have the burden of going forward and
proving that plaintiff was not an otherwise qualified person. "148 Ac-
cording to the court in Pushkin, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case by showing that he or she is qualified apart from the handicap
and was rejected under circumstances giving rise to the inference that
the handicap was the reason for the rejection.149 The court found that
Pushkin had established a prima facie case because his academic and
work records satisfied the standards demanded for the position he
sought and the reports on which .his rejection was based appeared to
"focus on his handicap."15 0 Next the defendants in section 504 cases
are required to prove "that plaintiff was not an otherwise qualified
handicapped person." 5 The court listed the reasons articulated by de-
fendants for rejecting the plaintiff15 ' but affirmed the district court's
finding that the plaintiff was "otherwise qualified" because the plaintiff
presented evidence to rebut each of the defendant's articulated rea-
sons.158 Thus, it found that the plaintiff had met his burden of rebut-
ting the reasons articulated by the defendant. The court described this
final phase of the analysis as plaintiff's "burden of going forward with
rebuttal evidence showing that the defendants' reasons for rejecting the
plaintiff are based on misconceptions or unfounded factual conclusions,
and that reasons articulated for the rejection other than the handicap
encompass unjustified consideration of the handicap itself. ' " Thus,
under Pushkin, after the prima facie case is established, the defendant
has the burden of persuasion to prove that the plaintiff was not "other-
wise qualified," and that burden remains on the defendant although the
plaintiff may have a burden of production to "go[ ] forward with rebut-
tal evidence." '155
147 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
148 658 F.2d at 1387.
149 Id. at 1384-85, 1387.
150 Id. at 1387-88.
L51 Id. at 1387.
25 Id. at 1388-89.
153 Id. at 1389-91.
154 Id. at 1387.
255 Id.
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2. Burden of Persuasion on Plaintiff
In Doe v. New York University the Second Circuit held that the
plaintiff in a section 504 case must "bear the ultimate burden of show-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence that in spite of the handicap he
is qualified."156 According to Doe v. New York University the plaintiff
must make a prima facie showing similar to that in Pushkin."5 The
prima facie case creates "an inference that the handicap was improp-
erly taken into account."
58
The defendant can then rebut this inference "by going forward
with evidence that the handicap is relevant to qualifications for the po-
sition sought."159 Once the initial inference is rebutted the plaintiff
must prove "by a preponderance of the evidence" that he or she is oth-
erwise qualified.1 60 According to Doe v. New York University the de-
fendant never has the burden of persuasion to show that the plaintiff is
not otherwise qualified. It must only rebut the initial inference by
showing "that the handicap is relevant to reasonable qualifications."161
3. Establishing the Appropriate Allocation of
Burdens of Proof
a. The Prima Facie Case
Courts have identified four elements that must be shown to make
out a prima facie case of a violation of section 504. A plaintiff must
show: (1) that he or she is handicapped under the definition of the Act;
(2) that he or she is "otherwise qualified" for employment or participa-
tion; (3) that he or she was rejected solely by reason of his or her hand-
icap; and (4) that the program he or she was rejected from receives
federal financial assistance.
16 2
15 666 F.2d at 776-77.
157 Id. at 776.
158 Id.
259 Id.
160 Id. at 776-77.
16 Id. at 777 n.7. Doe had been denied readmission to NYU Medical School
because of a personality disorder that had in the past manifested itself in self-destruc-
tive behavior. Despite her past, Doe had not had any recurrence of symptoms for four
years. Under these circumstances the court held that she had not "established any like-
lihood of success in proving that despite her handicap she is qualified for acceptance as
a medical student or to engage in the practice of medicine." Id. at 779. The Second
Circuit therefore reversed the district court's preliminary injunction that had required
NYU to admit Doe. Id.
11" See Strathie, 716 F.2d at 230; Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d at 773. Other
courts have stated the prima facie case with less than the four parts listed in the text,
but the omitted elements were satisfied in each case. Bentivegna v. United States Dep't
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A person is considered handicapped if he or she "has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such per-
son's major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is
regarded as having such an impairment." ' Major life activities are
defined by HHS regulations as "functions such as caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning, and working."' " The regulations specifically recognize
that individuals with histories of mental or emotional illnesses are ben-
eficiaries of the Act. 6
The second part of the prima facie case, that the plaintiff is "oth-
erwise qualified" for the position sought, is generally held to be estab-
lished by a showing that the handicapped individual is qualified for the
position apart from his or her handicap.166 Only if a handicapped indi-
vidual is not qualified for the position even if his or her handicap is
completely disregarded will the suit be dismissed for failure to make
out a prima facie case on the issue of whether the plaintiff is "other-
wise qualified.
'167
The third part of the prima facie case, that the plaintiff was re-
jected solely because of his or her handicap, is generally not difficult to
establish. Section 504 cases tend to center around the question whether
a person with a particular handicap can perform in a particular capac-
ity. Typically the defendant claims that a person with the plaintiff's
handicap cannot perform the required functions,"6 8 and thus essentially
admits that the handicap was the basis for the rejection. Even when
defendants attempt to deny that a handicap was the basis for rejection,
courts only require a showing that the plaintiff "was rejected under
circumstances which gave rise to the inference" that the rejection was
of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 1982); Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1387; see also
Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 309-10 (5th Cir. 1981) (prima
facie case in suit against federal agency).
163 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
6 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1983).
165 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A at 298 (1983).
16 E.g., Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1387.
167 It is vital to the establishment of a prima facie case for the plaintiff to show he
or she can meet all standards for employment except for the handicap. In Guertin v.
Hackerman, a physics professor with a hearing deficiency was fired from his position.
The court concluded that the reason for the discharge was the plaintiff's failure to meet
certain requirements for appropriate research topics rather than discrimination arising
from the hearing impairment. 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 207 (S.D. Tex. 1981);
see also Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp. 332, 341-42 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (aside from the
problems presented .by blindness, plaintiff was still not qualified for an administrative
position).
16 E.g., Strathie, 716 F.2d at 229-30 (person with hearing defect alleged unsuita-
ble to be a school bus driver).
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based solely on his or her handicap."' 9
The requirements of the final part of the prima facie case, that the
defendant receives federal funds, were recently clarified in Consolidated
Rail Corp. v. Darrone170 In that case the Supreme Court resolved
what had been a split among the circuits by holding that a section 504
plaintiff can sue an employer who receives federal funds even if provid-
ing employment is not a primary objective of the federal financial assis-
tance.171 This broad reading of section 504, which the Court found
supported by the language, legislative history, executive interpretation,
and purpose of the Act,17 2 makes it relatively easy for a plaintiff to
establish this part of the prima facie case.
Some courts seem to imply that a showing of discriminatory intent
is somehow relevant to a section 504 plaintiff's prima facie case.'17 Un-
like the elements discussed above, there is no requirement of intent in
the language of section 504.174 For all the reasons already discussed in
the section on intent, 7 5 intent should not be part of a section 504 plain-
tiff's prima facie case.
Section 504 cases tend to arise because of disputes over the limits
imposed by particular handicaps. Thus, although a few cases are dis-
missed for a failure to establish a prima facie case,'16 the typical case
progresses quickly past that stage and into the merits of whether the
plaintiff is otherwise qualified in spite of his or her handicap. Once the
prima facie case is established, that is the issue that must be litigated.
b. Determining Whether the Plaintiff Is Otherwise Qualified
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination under
section 504, the burden of persuasion should then be on the defendant
to prove that the plaintiff was not otherwise qualified for the position
sought. An employer can establish that a handicapped person is not
otherwise qualified for a job only by showing that the handicap pre-
vents the person from performing essential functions of the job and that
the handicap cannot reasonably be accommodated. Once such a show-
ing has been made, the plaintiff can offer evidence demonstrating that
the functions the employer is concerned about are not essential or that
169 Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1387.
170 104 S. Ct. at 1248 (1984).
7 Id. at 1253-56.
172 Id. at 1253-55.
173 See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
174 Cf Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1384 ("The standards for determining the merits of a
case under § 504 are contained in the statute.").
175 See supra notes 83-100 and accompanying text.
176 See supra note 167.
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there is a way for the employer reasonably to accommodate the plain-
tiff's handicap. This allocation of burdens is supported by the history
and policy of the Rehabilitation Act, the applicable HHS regulations,
and the Supreme Court decision in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis.
Section 504 was intended to open up employment opportunities for
handicapped people. Its design is to remedy misconceptions about the
limits of the ability of handicapped individuals actively to participate in
the work force and in other aspects of society.1" In order for section
504 to accomplish this task, defendants should have the burden of per-
suasion on the issue of whether a handicapped person is otherwise
qualified to perform a particular job. If a defendant can rebut the
plaintiff's prima facie case merely by presenting some generalized rea-
son why it would be difficult for a person with the plaintiff's handicap
to perform the job in question, then misconceptions will remain
uncorrected.
Allowing the defendant to rebut the inference of discrimination es-
tablished by the prima facie case by a lesser showing leads to the same
results reached by granting excessive deference to the employment deci-
sions of federally funded program administrators. 78 If the defendant's
burden is phrased, as it was in Doe v. New York University, as
"show[ing] that the handicap is relevant to reasonable qualifica-
tions,"1 9 then section 504 is reduced to an admonition to employers
that they should be able to come up with plausible justifications for
their judgment that it would be difficult for a handicapped person to
perform a particular job. Section 504 does much more than that. It
prohibits federally funded employers from refusing to hire qualified
handicapped persons. An employer who refuses to hire a handicapped
person must be prepared to show that that person is not qualified by
proving that he or she cannot perform essential functions of the job and
that there are no reasonable accommodations that might enable him or
her to perform those functions.1 " The employer, after all, possesses
177 See supra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 101-42 and accompanying text; see also infra note 180.
18 666 F.2d at 777 n.7.
"' The Third Circuit in Strathie reached this same conclusion despite its contrary
indications with respect to burdens of proof. Strathie held that a § 504 plaintiff "bears
the ultimate burden of proof as to [the issue whether the plaintiff was 'otherwise qtlali-
fled']." 716 F.2d at 230-31. Due to the posture of the case, however, it refused to
"consider whether a § 504 plaintiff or defendant may have any preliminary burdens of
persuasion or production." Id. at 230 n.5. Instead of phrasing accountability for em-
ployment decisions in terms of a defendant's burden of proof, the court held that a
handicapped individual should be considered otherwise qualified unless "there is a fac-
tual basis in the record reasonably demonstrating that accommodating that individual
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better knowledge of what the job requires than does a handicapped ap-
plicant. 81 Thus, an employer who refuses to hire a handicapped per-
son but cannot articulate what the handicapped person is incapable of
doing is discriminating on the basis of handicap.
Only after the defendant has established the specific essential func-
tions that the handicapped applicant cannot perform and has demon-
strated effectively that the potential accommodations of the applicant's
handicap would impose an undue burden should the plaintiff have a
burden of coming forward with evidence showing that the employer's
assessment is based on misconceptions of the plaintiff's actual abilities.
This burden should be a burden of production, not a burden of persua-
sion. Given the policy of the Rehabilitation Act to promote employment
opportunities for handicapped individuals and the Act's goal of the
"ccomplete integration of all individuals with handicaps into normal
community living, working, and service patterns,"18 the burden of per-
suasion that a plaintiff is not qualified for the position sought should
remain on the defendant. Where there is uncertainty, the policy of the
Act dictates that the handicapped individual be given the benefit of the
doubt.
At issue in section 504 cases is whether a handicapped person is
qualified to perform a certain job. The HHS regulations provide that
"'[q]ualified handicapped person' means: (1) With respect to employ-
ment, a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the job in question."', 8 For purposes
of agency enforcement of the nondiscrimination mandate of section 504,
the burden is on the federally funded employer to prove to the agency
that employment criteria that screen out handicapped persons are job-
related and necessary.'" A similar scheme should apply to private ac-
tions to enforce section 504.
The Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis
indicated that only qualifications "necessary for participation" should
be allowed to exclude handicapped people.' 85 It also said that unrea-
sonable "refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person" could
would require either a modification of the essential nature of the program, or impose
an undue burden on the recipient of federal funds." Id. at 231. This standard is a
rejection of the excessively deferential approach of some courts to decisions of § 504
defendants. See supra notes 101-23 and accompanying text. It yields a similar result for
§ 504 litigation to that of requiring the defendant to bear the burden of persuasion as
to whether the plaintiff is qualified in order to rebut plaintiff's prima facie case.
""' See Note, Rehabilitating Section 504, supra note 8, at 190.
182 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
18 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1983).
18 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
185 442 U.S. at 407.
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amount to discrimination violating section 504.86 This interpretation of
section 504 is consistent with the regulations defining a qualified hand-
icapped person as one "who, with reasonable accommodation, can per-
form the essential functions of the job in question." '18 Thus, in a pri-
vate action to enforce section 504, the determination whether the
plaintiff is otherwise qualified should also depend on whether the
handicap disables the plaintiff from performing functions essential to
the job in question and on whether such disability can be overcome by
some reasonable accommodation by the employer. As in the agency en-
forcement context, the employer should bear the burden of proof as to
these issues.
CONCLUSION
Large numbers of mentally and physically handicapped individu-
als capable of working are underemployed or unemployed. In many
instances, discrimination, and not a deficiency in training, prevents
handicapped people from finding and retaining meaningful employ-
ment. Handicapped individuals suffer from employment discrimination
because they have been incorrectly stereotyped by employers as a group
that lacks the prerequisite capabilities needed for full participation in
the work force.
Congress, recognizing the second-class status of handicapped indi-
viduals in the work force, enacted section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
in an effort to expand employment opportunities for handicapped per-
sons in both the public and private sectors. Section 504 prohibits feder-
ally funded activities and programs from discriminating against "other-
wise qualified" handicapped individuals. Agency regulations effec-
tuating the policies of section 504 specifically define the provisions of
the statute and provide for agency enforcement.
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis'" the Supreme
Court decided that section 504 does not require federally funded pro-
grams to disregard handicaps, but the Court did require that programs
that receive federal funds must show that standards that exclude handi-
capped individuals be necessary for participation in the program. It also
indicated that programs must provide reasonable accommodations ena-
bling handicapped individuals to participate.
Following Davis some lower courts have adopted approaches to
section 504 cases that are deferential to the employment decisions of the
186 Id. at 412-13.
187 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1983).
-88 442 U.S. 297 (1979).
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administrators of federally funded programs and thus impose undue
burdens on plaintiffs attempting to enforce their rights under the Reha-
bilitation Act. Some courts have read section 504 to require the plaintiff
to show discriminatory intent. Another way of granting undue defer-
ence to the decisions of section 504 defendants is the practice of some
courts to refuse to find discrimination as long as there is some rational
basis for making the decision to reject the handicapped applicant. Both
the intent requirement and rational basis review belong (if they have
any place at all) in constitutional equal protection clause cases; they
should play no part in section 504 actions. A third way courts have
weakened section 504 is by reducing the burden of proof on the defend-
ant to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case.
In order to effectuate the policy of section 504, all of these ap-
proaches, which are overly and overtly deferential to section 504 defen-
dants, should be rejected. A case should not be tried on the basis of how
much or how,little deference should be given to a party against whom a
prima facie case of discrimination has been made out. Once the prima
facie case has been established, the court, and not the employer, must
determine whether the plaintiff is qualified for the position sought. The
defendant should have the burden of proving that the plaintiff cannot
perform essential functions of. the job and that any potential accommo-
dation of the plaintiff's handicap would impose an undue, unreasonable
burden on the defendant. The plaintiff then can come forward with
evidence demonstrating that the employer's concerns are based on mis-
conceptions of the plaintiff's abilities and of the potential for accommo-
dation. The policy of the Act, which encourages empldyment of handi-
capped individuals, counsels that the burden of persuasion should
remain on the defendant.
Adopting an approach deferential to section 504 defendants would
leave discrimination against handicapped individuals unremedied. The
allocation of the burdens of proof described above would enable courts
to determine whether a plaintiff actually can perform the functions re-
quired by the job in question. Courts must make that determination if
they are to carry out the mandate of section 504.
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